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Abstract
In nowadays applications of temporal deontic logic to the veriﬁcation of security policies, an issue arises
concerning the temporal inheritance of future directed obligations that have net yet been met. We investigate
decision procedures for temporal deontic logics that account for this particular interaction between time
and obligation.
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1 Introduction
At least since the eighties, deontic logicians have been interested in the relation be-
tween deontic modalities and time [23,2,11,24,18,22,1,5]. The addition of a temporal
dimension to deontic operators was expected to shed new light on the problems con-
cerning the so called deontic ‘paradoxes’. And indeed, several authors have shown
that at least part of the confusion raised by such examples as Chisholm’s ‘help-
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disambiguated by making the implicit temporal connotations of deontic modalities
explicit.
But, also recent developments in logics for dynamical phenomena such as an-
nouncement and update logics, have sparked new interest in the relation between
epistemic and preferential modalities on the one hand, and time, action, or update
modalities, on the other hand. For instance, in Van Benthem and Liu’s upgrade
logics [26], preference relations, which can also be used to model dispositions in
deontic ideality, are updated through announcements, raising new questions about
the dynamic properties of obligations.
A seemingly rather important, though not extensively studied aspect of the
interaction of time and obligation, is the issue of preservation. In particular, a
sensible and often desirable property, is that if a future directed obligation is not
met currently, it propagates to the next moment of time. Another way of putting
it is to say that moments inherit obligations from the past, if they have not been
complied to. In earlier papers [7,6] we have mainly tried to give a formal semantics
to this intuition concerning the preservation of obligations. The present paper
investigates inference mechanisms that are complete with respect to the earlier
proposed semantics.
2 Expressiveness needs
Temporal deontic frameworks have many applications. An example is the speciﬁ-
cation of security policies which go beyond usual access control. For instance, if we
want to specify that it is obligatory for a user to release a resource if this user has
been idle for more than one minute. More speciﬁcation examples involving temporal
and deontic concepts are given below.
• useri has to release resource r after 5 time units of utilization
• useri has the permission to use resource r continuously for 5 time units, and he
must be able to access it 15 time units after asking, at the latest
• If useri is asking for resource r and he has the permission to use it, then the
system has the obligation to give it to him before 5 time units
• If useri uses the resource without permission, he must not ask for it during 10
time units
Such sentences can be easily formalized in a logical language with standard
temporal and deontic operators. For instance, the ﬁrst rule is formally expressed
by
G (accessi ⇒ O( F5 releasei))
where G(ϕ) means it is henceforth true that ϕ, O(ϕ) means that it is obligatory to
satisfy ϕ, and Fk (ϕ) means that ϕ will be satisﬁed before k time units.
For the pure temporal and deontic fragments of our logic, we consider Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) [21] and Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) [27]. Of course, the
more interesting questions concern the possible and desirable interactions of the
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temporal and deontic modalities. The interaction property we focus on concerns
the propagation of obligations: if a future-directed obligation is not fulﬁlled yet,
then it propagates to the next moment. For instance, if it is obligatory to release
the resource before 5 time units and it is not released now, then in one time unit
from now it will be obligatory to release the resource before 4 time units.
Other combinations of temporal and deontic logics have been studied. For in-
stance, in [1,3,11] branching-time temporal and deontic logics are proposed. How-
ever, the temporal operators in these frameworks diﬀer considerably from the more
standard operators we use in our work. Essentially, these operators have a semantics
that nowadays would be called ‘hybrid’. In this semantics, each operator refers to a
speciﬁc time point. Also, the interaction of the temporal and deontic dimensions in
the above mentioned approaches has the following drawback: if ϕ is a propositional
formula then ϕ⇒ O(ϕ) is valid, i.e., every proposition which is true in the current
state is obligatory.
In [5,10], the propagation of obligations is studied for deadline obligations. A re-
ductionist approach is used, i.e., the deontic dimension is embedded in the temporal
dimension. So it is not possible to talk about both dimensions independently.
Taking the modal product of linear temporal logic and standard deontic logic
as the starting point, in [6] we developed a logic in which obligations are preserved
depending on what is true in the current history. (Product based approaches with-
out such interactions are studied in [9,7].) In [6] we suggested to incorporate the
preservation property by designing a logic that validates:
O(ϕ ∨Xψ) ∧ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬O(ϕ) ⇒ XO(ψ)
with ϕ any propositional formula, and ψ any formula. The initial idea was just to
take sets of deontically ideal histories to give semantics to obligation.
One of our suggestions is then that for assessing deontic ideality of histories, we
should only consider the histories whose past is identical to the past of the current
history. The reason for this is that we assume obligations do not apply to the past,
but only to the present and the future. Then, clearly, we do not want to consider
histories whose past, as seen from the current state, is more or less deontically ideal
than the ‘current’ past. We thus only assess ideality for the histories that share their
past with the current history. The collective past of the set of histories thus obtained
then represents what actually has happened. And what actually has happened, is
going to inﬂuence what is obliged currently, according to the preservation property
we aim at.
A second aspect of our semantics is that the future directed obligations are not
‘forgotten’ when time advances. This means that the number of ideal histories can
only shrink as time advances. The principle of propagation then should point us to
what subset of ideal histories to take when moving to a next moment in time.
An interesting question concerns what happens if the set of ideal histories shrinks
to the empty set. Of course, this could happen easily if p is obliged currently while
at the same time ¬p holds. Then, at the next moment, the intersection of, on
the one hand, the histories with pasts identical to the past of the actual history
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and, on the other hand, the ideal histories, is empty. This yields a situation where
everything is obliged. This happens whenever an obligation whose compliance can
no longer be deferred, is violated anyway. Diﬀerent reactions are possible to this
peculiarity of the semantics. One way out, though not an attractive one, is to
suggest that the models should be such that this is excluded. But, then we would
have a logic where the obligations are never violated, which means that the logic
cannot count as ‘deontic’. But, in [6] we discussed that a natural way to solve this
problem is to adopt a generalization to levels of ideality. And that is also the setting
in the present paper. We use an ordering on histories to deﬁne obligation as follows:
O(ϕ) is satisﬁed at an instant i of an history w if : there is an history w′ whose past
coincides with w’s until i, such that every history with the same past, which is at least
as good as w′, satisﬁes ϕ at instant i. This semantics seems rather complex. But its
naturalness is underlined by the fact that Horty, in his book on deontic logic [17],
gives a basically identical semantics for ‘ought-to-be’ in his branching time STIT
framework. The complexity of this semantics makes it diﬃcult to establish logical
results, such as an axiomatization or a decision procedure. In order to develop a
decision procedure and an axiomatization, we propose to decompose the modality
O into more primitive normal operators.
3 Syntax and semantics
In this section, we deﬁne the language of our logic and its semantics. Diﬀerent
quantiﬁers are hidden in the semantic deﬁnition of the obligation. Two accessibility
relations are involved: the relation ’at least as good as’, which will be denoted by
 and models preference between histories, and the relation ’has the same past
as’, which will be denoted by SamePast. In order to deﬁne O in terms of more
primitive modal operators, it is natural to introduce a modal operator [SP ] which
corresponds to the relation ’has the same past’ (SamePast), and another operator
[SP∩ ] which corresponds to the intersection of both semantic relations. The
obligation operator O will be deﬁned in terms of the primitive operators [SP ] and
[SP∩ ].
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Syntax] Given a ﬁnite set P of atomic propositions, the language
of our logic is deﬁned by the following syntax:
ϕ ::=  | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Xϕ | ϕUϕ | [SP ]ϕ | [SP∩ ]ϕ
where  is a logical constant (’true’), and p ∈ P is an atomic proposition. We deﬁne
the following standard abbreviations:
⊥ def= ¬
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 def= ¬(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2) < SP > ϕ def= ¬[SP ]¬ϕ
ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 def= ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 < SP∩ > ϕ def= ¬[SP∩ ]¬ϕ
F ϕ
def
= Uϕ G ϕ def= ¬F ¬ϕ
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• Xϕ means ϕ will hold in the next state.
• ϕ1Uϕ2 means there is an instant i at which ϕ2 will hold, and ϕ1 holds from now
until the instant before i.
• [SP ]ϕ means in every state that has the same past as the current state, ϕ holds.
• [SP∩ ] means in every state that has the same past and is at least as good as
(or preferred to) the current state, ϕ holds.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Model] A model is a tuple (W,, V ), where
• W is a set of histories. Time is implicitly modeled by the set N of non-negative
integers. A state is then a moment/history pair (i, w) ∈ N×W ,
• ⊆ W ×W is a total (or complete) quasi-ordering on W (reﬂexive, transitive,
and total relation),
• V : N ×W → 2P is a valuation which associates each state with a set of atomic
propositions.
Notice that the frames these models are based on can be suitably viewed as
products [16], of the temporal frames (N,+1, <) and the deontic frames (W,),
where +1 and  are the successor relation and the usual order on N, respectively.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Satisfaction]Given a model M = (W,, V ), a state (i, w), and a
formula ϕ, we deﬁne the satisfaction relation by induction on ϕ:
M, i, w |= 
M, i, w |= p iﬀ p ∈ V (i, w)
M, i, w |= ¬ϕ iﬀ M, i, w  ϕ
M, i, w |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iﬀ M, i, w |= ϕ1 or M, i, w |= ϕ2
M, i, w |= Xϕ iﬀ M, i+ 1, w |= ϕ
M, i, w |= ϕ1Uϕ2 iﬀ ∃i′  i such that M, i′, w |= ϕ2 and
∀i” ∈ N if i  i” < i′ then M, i”, w |= ϕ1
M, i, w |= [SP ]ϕ iﬀ ∀w′ ∈W if SamePast(i, w,w′) then M, i, w′ |= ϕ
M, i, w |= [SP∩ ]ϕ iﬀ ∀w′ ∈W if w  w′ and SamePast(i, w,w′)
then M, i, w′ |= ϕ
where SamePast(i, w,w′) def= ∀j < i V (j, w) = V (j, w′).
A model (W,, V ) satisﬁes ϕ if for every state i, w ∈ N×W i,w |= ϕ.
ϕ is said to be valid if every model satisﬁes it. ϕ is said to be satisﬁable if there is
a model (W,, V ), a history w ∈W , and a number i ∈ N, such that i, w |= ϕ.
Remark 3.4 Notice that satisﬁability and validity can be evaluated at the begin-
ning of time, and the resulting logic is then called the anchored version [19] of the
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logic. On the other hand, our deﬁnition corresponds to the so-called ﬂoating ver-
sion. If the logic contains no past operators, then both notions deﬁne the same set
of valid formulas. If the logic contains past operators, as will be the case in sec-
tion 5, both versions are related to each other through an additional constant init,
which is true in the ﬁrst state of every model: ϕ is valid in the anchored version iﬀ
(init ⇒ ϕ) is valid in the ﬂoating version, and ϕ is valid in the ﬂoating version iﬀ
G ϕ is valid in the anchored version.
The modal operators [SP ] and [SP∩ ] that allow to quantify over the histories
only consider histories which have the same past as the current one. So, from
a given instant i of a given history w, they only ’access’ histories w′ such that
SamePast(i, w,w′).
One might wonder if a branching time setting would not be more appropriate
for our semantics. For one thing, in a branching time setting, ideal versions of the
current history ‘automatically’ have the same past. However, in settings like CTL
(though not in STIT-frameworks), ideal versions of the current history would also
automatically have the same ‘present’. This means that if we apply the semantics
to a CTL-setting, we cannot talk about what is obliged for the current moment.
Another reason for not considering branching time in the current setting, is that
it is not clear whether or not in a branching time setting we should actually look
at deontic ideality of ‘trees’ instead of histories. And then, if we decide to look at
ideal histories, in branching time structures two histories still may satisfy the same
atomic propositions once they have split. Then it is unclear whether our criterion




=< SP > [SP∩ ]ϕ
Notice that the semantic characterization of O coincides with the semantic def-
inition of obligation given in [6]:
i, w |= O(ϕ) iﬀ ∃w′ ∈W such that SamePast(i, w,w′) and
∀w′′ ∈W if SamePast(i, w,w′′) and w′  w′′ then i, w′′ |= ϕ
4 Decision procedure for satisﬁability
As a ﬁrst remark, our logic lacks the ﬁnite model property. Indeed, it can easily
be shown that the following formula has only inﬁnite models, i.e., models (W,, V )
where W is an inﬁnite set of histories:
[SP ]AtMostOnce(p) ∧ G < SP > p
where AtMostOnce(p) stands for G(p ⇒ XG¬p). To establish the decidability of
this logic would require complex techniques, such as quasi-model method [28,15]. In
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this section, we show the decidability of the until-free fragment of the logic, using
a tableaux-like decision procedure.
We describe a tableaux method with explicit accessibility relations. We use the
notation of preﬁxed formulas i, w : ϕ, where the preﬁx i, w intuitively represents a
state that satisﬁes the formula ϕ. i is a non-negative integer, and w is a history.
Contrary to usual preﬁxed tableaux [13,20], we do not encode accessibility relation
into the node names. We represent explicitly the three distinct accessibility relations
(’temporal successor’, ’at least as good as’, and ’same past’).
A tableau T is a structure we keep as close to a model as possible. It consists
of a set of histories W , a set of moments M ⊆ N, a labelling function L which
associates each moment/history pair with a set of formulas, a quasi-ordering R on
W , and a set of equivalence relations (RSP i)i∈M on W . Intuitively, (w,w′) ∈ R
means that history w′ is at least as good as w; (w,w′) ∈ RSP i means that histories
w and w′ have the same past until i (they satisfy the same propositions until the
moment before i). Tableaux rules specify how, and under which conditions, T is
updated.
We now formally describe tableau data structure and update operations.
4.1 Tableau data structure and update operations
A tableau for a formula φ is a tuple T = (W,M, v0, L,R, (RSP i)i∈M ) where
• W is a set of histories
• M ⊆ N is a set of moments; a node of the tableau is then a moment/history pair
(i, w) ∈M ×W
• v0 ∈M ×W is the root
• L : M ×W → sub(φ) is a label function which associates each node with a set of
sub-formulas of φ. In the remainder, we write i, w : ϕ for ϕ ∈ L(i, w). The label
of the root contains φ: φ ⊆ L(v0).
• R ⊆W ×W is a reﬂexive and transitive relation on W
• RSP i ⊆ W ×W for each i ∈ M , is an equivalence relation on W . The following
property between the diﬀerent RSP i is satisﬁed:
(∗) ∀w,w′ ∈W ∀i ∈M (w,w′) ∈ RSP i ⇒ ∀j ∈M j < i⇒ (w,w′) ∈ RSP j
We now give the procedural semantics of our tableau operations add form,
new world, new instant, and add pair, which update a data structure T .
• add form(i, w, ϕ) adds the formula ϕ to the label L(i, w).
• add pair(R ; (w,w′)), for R = R or R = RSP i, adds pair (w,w′) to relation
R, and updates R with its reﬂexive and transitive closure in case R = R, with
its reﬂexive, transitive, and symmetric closure in case R = RSP i. Moreover, if
R = RSP i, then for every j ∈ M such that j < i, RSP j is updated so that the
constraint (∗) is satisﬁed.
• new history adds a new history to W and returns the corresponding name.
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• add inst(i) adds instant i to the set M if i /∈M .
We can combine these atomic actions with the two following combinators: the
sequential operator ’;’ and the nondeterministic choice operator ’[]’.
4.2 Tableaux rules
In this section, we present our tableaux rules.
• double negation rule
i,w:¬¬ϕ
add form(i,w,ϕ)¬¬
• rule α (resp. β) is the usual rule for conjunction (resp. disjunction).
i, w : ¬(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
add form(i, w,¬ϕ1); add form(i, w,¬ϕ2)α
i, w : ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
add form(i, w, ϕ1) [] add form(i, w, ϕ2)
β
This presentation of rule β corresponds to a depth-ﬁrst computation, as in [12],
whereas other presentations (equivalent to ours) compute both possibilities in
parallel (width-ﬁrst computation).
• rules X and ¬X extend the label of the successor node as follows:
i, w : Xϕ
add inst(i+ 1) ; add form(i + 1, w, ϕ)
X
i,w : ¬Xϕ
add inst(i+ 1) ; add form(i + 1, w,¬ϕ)¬X
• rules Π add a new history if a node is labelled by a ’diamond’ formula of the form
¬[SP ]ϕ or of the form ¬[SP∩ ]ϕ.
i, w : ¬[SP ]ϕ
w′ := new history ; add form(i, w′,¬ϕ) : add pair(RSP i, (w,w′))
ΠSP
i, w : ¬[SP∩ ]ϕ
w′ := new history ; add form(i, w′,¬ϕ) ;
add pair(R , (w,w′)) ; add pair(RSP i , (w,w′))
ΠSP∩
• rules K adds formula ϕ to a node i, w′ if node (i, w) is labeled by a ’box’ formula
of the form [SP ]ϕ, or of the form [SP∩ ]ϕ, and w′ is an accessible history from
w.
i, w : [SP ]ϕ and (w,w′) ∈ RSP i
add form(i, w′, ϕ)
KSP
i, w : [SP∩ ]ϕ and (w,w′) ∈ RSP i and (w,w′) ∈ R
add form(i, w′, ϕ)
KSP∩
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• rule update SP applies if two states which share the same past until moment i
still satisfy the same propositions at i. Besides, for each atomic proposition, either
this proposition or its negation has to be satisﬁed in both states (i.e., the states
have to be saturated). Then RSP i+1 is updated so that w and w′ are considered
as having the same past until i + 1.
(w,w′) ∈ RSP i and ∀p ∈ P (i, w : p and i, w′ : p) or (i, w : ¬p and i, w′ : ¬p)
add pair(RSP i+1 ; (w,w
′))
update SP
• rule Saturation aims at saturating the states in atomic propositions so that rule
update SP can be applied.
p ∈ P and i ∈M and w ∈W
add form(i, w, p ∨ ¬p) saturation
• rule  −totality aims at guaranteeing the totality of R.
(w,w′) /∈ R and (w′, w) /∈ R
add pair(R, (w,w′)) [] add pair(R, (w′, w))
 −totality
Deﬁnition 4.1 [Closed tableau] A tableau is said to be closed if
• ϕ and ¬ϕ label some node i, w,
• or ∃w,w′ ∈W ∃i ∈M ∃p ∈ P such that
i, w : p and i, w′ : ¬p and (w,w′) ∈ RSP i+1
Deﬁnition 4.2 [Completed and open tableau] A tableau T is completed if for every
rule r
• either r is not enabled, i.e., the premise of r is not satisﬁed
• or r is enabled, and the application of the consequent of r has no eﬀect
We consider that add inst(i) has no eﬀect if i ∈ M , add form(i, w, ϕ) has no
eﬀect if ϕ ∈ L(i, w), and add pair(R, (w,w′)) has no eﬀect if (w,w′) ∈ R, with
R = R or R = RSP i.
A tableau is open if it is completed and not closed.
4.3 Soundness and completeness
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness) If a formula ϕ is satisﬁable then there is an open
tableau whose root is labeled by ϕ.
Deﬁnition 4.4 [Tableaux interpretation] Let T = (W,M, v0, L,R, (RSP i)i∈M ) be
a tableau and (Wˆ , ˆ, V ) be a model. An interpretation of T in (Wˆ , ˆ, V ) is a
mapping ι from W to Wˆ such that for every w1, w2 in W , and every nonnegative
integer i
• (w1, w2) ∈ R implies ι(w1)ˆι(w2), and
• (w1, w2) ∈ RSP i implies ∀j < i V (j, ι(w1)) = V (j, ι(w2))
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Deﬁnition 4.5 [Satisﬁable tableau] A tableau T for a formula φ is satisﬁable if
there is a model (W,, V ) and a tableau interpretation ι of T in (Wˆ , ˆ, V ) such
that for every node (i, w) and every formula ϕ ∈ L(i, w), we have i, ι(w) |= ϕ.
Lemma 4.6 Let T be a satisﬁable tableau. The tableau T ′ (or one of the two
tableaux T ′, T”, in case the nondeterministic choice operator is used) obtained by
the application of some rule is also satisﬁable.
Proof. Let T be a satisﬁable tableau. There is a model (Wˆ , ˆ, Vˆ ) and a tableau
interpretation ι such that for every node (i, w) and every formula ϕ ∈ L(i, w), we
have i, ι(w) |= ϕ. We have to consider each rule and prove that the application of
this rule preserves the tableau satisﬁability.
• ¬¬, α, β,X,¬X, saturation, −totality: the proof is left to the reader.
• rule KSP (the proof for KSP∩ is similar). Suppose that i, w : [SP ]ϕ. Then
rule KSP adds ϕ to any node (i, w′) such that (w,w′) ∈ RSP i. By hypothesis,
i, ι(w) |= [SP ]ϕ, and, since (w,w′) ∈ RSP i, we have SamePast(i, ι(w), ι(w′)).
Thus, i, ι(w′) |= ϕ, and so T ′ is still satisﬁable.
• rule ΠSP (the proof for ΠSP∩ is similar):
Suppose that i, w : ¬[SP ]ϕ. Then the application of ΠSP creates a new history
w′, labels it with ¬ϕ, and adds (w,w′) to RSP i. We have to extend the mapping
ι so that it associates a history with the new preﬁx w′. By hypothesis, i, ι(w) |=
¬[SP ]ϕ. Then there is some wˆ′ ∈ Wˆ such that SamePast(i, ι(w), wˆ′) and i, wˆ′ |=




wˆ′ if s = w′
ι(s) else
ι is a tableau interpretation, and T ′ is satisﬁable.
• rule update SP :
Let i, w and i, w′ be two nodes of T such that (w,w′) ∈ RSP i and ∀p ∈ P (i, w :
p and i, w′ : p) or (i, w : ¬p and i, w : ¬p). Then the pair (w,w′) is added to
RSP i+1. We must show that ∀j < i + 1 Vˆ (j, ι(w)) = Vˆ (j, ι(w′)). Since ι is a
T -interpretation, then ∀j < i Vˆ (j, ι(w)) = Vˆ (j, ι(w′)). Besides, ∀p ∈ P (i, w :
p and i, w′ : p) or (i, w : ¬p and i, w : ¬p). So ∀p ∈ P i, ι(w) |= p iﬀ i, ι(w′) |= p.
So Vˆ (i, ι(w)) = Vˆ (i, ι(w′)).

Proof. [Proof of the soundness theorem (4.3)]
Suppose ϕ is a satisﬁable formula. then there is a model (W,, V ), a nonnega-
tive integer i ∈ N and a history w ∈ W such that i, w |= ϕ. Then the tableau
whose only node (i, w) is labelled by ϕ, and whose relations (RSP i) and R are
reduced to singleton {(w,w)}, is satisﬁable (with the identity function as a tableau
interpretation). Then, by lemma 4.6, the application of any rule provides a satis-
ﬁable tableau. Since a closed tableau is obviously unsatisﬁable, we can generate a
(possibly inﬁnite) open tableau whose root is labelled by ϕ. 
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Theorem 4.7 (Completeness) If there is an open tableau whose root (i, w) is
labeled by ϕ, then ϕ is satisﬁable.
Proof. Let T = (W,M, v0, L,R, (RSP i)i∈M ) be an open tableau whose root v0 is
labeled by φ. We build a model (Wˆ , ˆ, V ) from T such that for every w ∈ W and
i ∈M , i, w : ϕ iﬀ i, wˆ |= ϕ. We deﬁne
Wˆ
def
= W and ˆ def= R
We can now deﬁne the valuation V as follows, for any i ∈ N, w ∈ Wˆ :
• if i ∈M then V (i, w) def= {p ∈ P / (i, w : p)}
• if i /∈M then V (i, w) def= ∅
We now prove by induction on the structure of ϕ that for every i ∈M , w ∈W ,
if i, w : ϕ then i, w |= ϕ (in the model (Wˆ , ˆ, V )). Cases ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ¬(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), Xϕ,
¬Xϕ, are obvious.
• Suppose i, w :< SP > ϕ. Rule ΠSP ensures the existence of a node i, w′ labeled
by ϕ such that (w,w′) in RSP i. Then, since T is open, ∀p ∈ P, ∀j < i, j, w :
p iﬀ j, w′ : p. So, ∀j < i V (j, w) = V (j, w′), and i, w′ |= ϕ (by induction
hypothesis). So i, w |=< SP > ϕ.
The proof for < SP∩ > ϕ is similar.
• Suppose i, w : [SP ]ϕ. Let w′ ∈ Wˆ be a history such that ∀j < i, V (j, w) =
V (j, w′). Thanks to rule update SP , (w,w′) ∈ RSP i. By rule KSP , we have that
i, w′ : ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, i, w′ |= ϕ, and thus i, w |= [SP ]ϕ.
The proof for [SP∩ ]ϕ is similar.

4.4 Termination
We now deﬁne a terminating strategy which is still sound and complete. Termi-
nation is based on loop detection. Although it is clear that the number of created
instants is bounded by the modal depth of ϕ with respect to X, the tableau con-
struction may create an inﬁnite number of histories. We have to block the creation
of new histories when a loop is detected. Since we have two modal operators that
can create new histories, we deﬁne looping histories with respect to each one.
• a history w is looping with respect to < SP > if
· rule ΠSP is applicable in (i, w), for some i ∈M
· w has been created by rule ΠSP at instant i and there exists an older history w′
such that (w′, w) ∈ RSP i and L(i, w) ⊆ L(i, w′) (such a history w′ is denoted
by loopSP (w))
• a history w is looping with respect to < SP∩ > if
· rule ΠSP∩ is applicable in (i, w), for some i ∈M
· w has been created by rule ΠSP∩ at instant i and there exists an older history
w′ such that (w′, w) ∈ RSP i, (w′, w) ∈ R and L(i, w) ⊆ L(i, w′) (such a history
w′ is denoted by loopSP∩(w))
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Deﬁnition 4.8 [Strategy] Let us consider the algorithm which consists in applying
successively the following steps while the tableau is not closed, starting from the
tableau such that W = {w}, M = {0}, v0 = (0, w), L(v0) = {φ}, R = {(w,w)},
and RSP 0 = {(w,w)}.
• Application of classical rules ¬¬, α, β as much as possible.
• Loop detection step for < SP >: mark every looping history with respect to
< SP >.
• Loop detection step for < SP∩ >: mark every looping history with respect to
< SP∩ >.
• Application of rules ΠSP and ΠSP∩ on every state on which they have not
already been applied, and which is not marked with respect to < SP > and
< SP∩ >, respectively.
• Application of rule saturation and then rule update SP as much as possible.
• Application of rule  −totality on every pair (w,w′) on which it has not been
applied.
• Application of rules X, ¬X, KSP , and KSP∩ as much as possible.
Proposition 4.9 (Termination) The strategy given above terminates.
Proof. First, remark that
(1) M is ﬁnite (bounded by the modal depth of the initial formula φ with respect to
X);
(2) there are ﬁnitely many sets of sub-formulas of the initial formula φ.
We show that there cannot be an inﬁnite sequence of histories (w0, w1, w2, . . .)
such that each wk+1 is created by the application of rule ΠSP or ΠSP∩ to some
point of the history wk. Indeed, suppose it is the case.
Suppose that there are inﬁnitely many applications of rule ΠSP . Since there
are ﬁnitely many sub-formulas of φ, there is a formula ¬[SP ]ϕ which triggers rule
ΠSP inﬁnitely often. Suppose that ΠSP is triggered inﬁnitely often by ¬[SP ]ϕ at
instant 0. Then, ¬[SP ]ϕ appears necessarily in the scope of [SP ] or [SP∩ ] in
L(0, wk) for some wk in the sequence, and we can prove that there exists k′ from
which ¬[SP ]ϕ labels every history of the sequence (∀k” > k′ ¬[SP ]ϕ ∈ L(0, wk”)).
So, there is an application of ΠSP which creates a history wk0 (at instant 0) such
that
• ¬[SP ]ϕ ∈ L(0, wk0)
• ∃k < k0 such that L(0, wk0) ⊆ L(0, wk) (because of remark (2)) and (wk, wk0) ∈
SP0
Therefore, wk0 is looping with respect to ΠSP , and our strategy cannot generate
such an inﬁnite sequence. We then prove that ΠSP cannot be triggered inﬁnitely
often at instant 1, 2, . . . , and max(M). (Existence of max(M) follows from remark
(1).)
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The same reasoning shows that there cannot be inﬁnitely many applications of
ΠSP∩. 
Proposition 4.10 The strategy given above is sound and complete.
Proof. The soundness of the strategy obviously follows from the soundness of the
tableaux system (theorem 4.3).
On the other hand, in order to prove the completeness of the strategy, the com-
pleteness proof of theorem 4.7 has to be adapted. Suppose that
T = (W,M, v0, L,R, (RSP i)i∈M ) is an open tableau resulting from our strategy.
We build a model (Wˆ , ˆ, V ) where Wˆ contains every history which is not marked
as a looping history (at the last iteration of the strategy). Every pair (w,wloop) in
R, where wloop is a looping history with respect to < SP > (resp. < SP∩ >),
is replaced by the pair (w, loopSP (wloop)) (resp. loopSP∩(wloop)) in ˆ. We then
have to prove that i, w : ϕ implies i, w |= ϕ by induction on the structure of ϕ,
for every non-looping history w. The proof for cases ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ¬(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), Xϕ,
¬Xϕ, [SP ]ϕ, and [SP∩ ]ϕ is similar to the proof of theorem 4.7. Suppose that
i, w :< SP > ϕ. Rule ΠSP ensures the existence of a node i, w′ labeled by ϕ such
that (w,w′) ∈ RSP i. If w′ is not looping, then we can conclude i, w′ |= ϕ as in
the proof of theorem 4.7. If w′ is looping with respect to < SP >, then we can
prove that i, loopSP (w′) |= ϕ. Notice that w′ cannot be lopping with respect to
< SP∩ > since we suppose it has been created by application of rule ΠSP in node
i, w. The proof for case < SP∩ > is similar.

5 Complete axiomatization
In this section, we propose an axiomatic system for our logic. For technical reasons,
we enrich our language with three modal operators: X−1, [], and []. X−1 is
needed for the axiomatization of [SP ], and [] and [] are needed for the axioma-
tization of [SP∩ ]. Our axiomatic system is complete with respect to a semantics
which slightly diﬀers from the one given in section 3. First, the time is implicitly
modeled by the set Z of the integers instead of the set N of the non-negative inte-
gers. Second, we drop the constraint of totality of the quasi-ordering . We call
Lmin the logic deﬁned by this semantics, and whose language contains the modal
operators X,X−1, [SP ], [SP∩ ], [], []. Let us give the semantics of these new
operators.
i, w |= X−1ϕ iﬀ i− 1, w |= ϕ
i, w |= []ϕ iﬀ ∀w′ ∈W if w  w′ then i, w′ |= ϕ
i, w |= []ϕ iﬀ ∀w′ ∈W if w′  w then i, w′ |= ϕ
In this section we will propose an axiomatic system for Lmin. For all formulas
ϕ, we deﬁne X0ϕ
def
= ϕ, for each positive integer i, X iϕ
def
= Xi−1Xϕ, and for each
negative integer i, Xiϕ
def
= Xi+1X−1ϕ.
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5.1 Admissible forms
For the deﬁnition of the special rules of inference, we will need expressions of a
special form, called admissible forms, denoted by capital Latin letters A, B, etc.
Let the language of Lmin be extended with a new atomic proposition . Admissible
forms are deﬁned by the following rule:
A ::=  | (ϕ⇒ A) | XA | X−1A | [SP ]A | []A | []A | [SP∩ ]A.
Note that in each admissible form,  has a unique occurrence. Let A be an admissible
form and ϕ be a formula. The result of the replacement of the unique occurrence
of  in its place in A with ϕ will be denoted by A(ϕ).
5.2 Axiomatization
Our axiomatic system for Lmin is based on the following set of axioms and rules of
inference:
Axioms
(A0) Classical tautologies are axioms.
(K) For all L ∈ {X,X−1, [SP ], [], [], [SP∩ ]},
L(ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2) ⇒ (Lϕ1 ⇒ Lϕ2).
(A1) ¬Xϕ ⇔ X¬ϕ, ϕ⇒ XX−1ϕ.
(A2) ¬X−1ϕ⇔ X−1¬ϕ, ϕ⇒ X−1Xϕ.
(A3) [SP ]ϕ⇒ ϕ, [SP ]ϕ⇒ [SP ][SP ]ϕ, ϕ⇒ [SP ]〈SP 〉ϕ.
(A4) []ϕ⇒ ϕ, []ϕ⇒ [][]ϕ, ϕ⇒ []〈〉ϕ.
(A5) []ϕ⇒ ϕ, []ϕ⇒ [][]ϕ, ϕ⇒ []〈〉ϕ.
(A6) if i < j then for all p ∈ P , the following formulas are axioms:
X ip⇒ Xj [SP ]Xi−jp, Xi¬p⇒ Xj [SP ]Xi−j¬p.
(A7) X[]ϕ⇔ []Xϕ, X−1[]ϕ⇔ []X−1ϕ.
(A8) X[]ϕ⇔ []Xϕ, X−1[]ϕ⇔ []X−1ϕ.
(A9) [SP ]ϕ ∨ []ϕ⇒ [SP∩ ]ϕ.
Rules of inference
Modus ponens: From ϕ1 and ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 infer ϕ2.
necessitation: For all L ∈ {X,X−1, [SP ], [], [], [SP∩ ]},
from ϕ infer Lϕ.
[SP ] special rule: If  ∈ {[], []} and i < 0, then
from {A(¬(ϕ ∨Xip) ∨Xip) : p ∈ P} infer A(¬[SP ]ϕ).
[SP∩ ] special rule:
From {A(〈SP 〉(ϕ ∧ p) ∨ 〈〉(ϕ ∧ ¬p)) : p ∈ P} infer A(〈SP∩ 〉ϕ).
Special rules are needed because of two non-standard aspects of our logic:
• the semantic relation associated with [SP ] refers to the valuation of a given model
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• operator [SP∩ ] corresponds to the intersection of two semantic relations
Their origin is more technical that intuitive: they have been exhibited so that
the truth lemma (lemma 5.5) can be proved for formulas of the form [SP ]ϕ and
[SP∩ ]ϕ. Special rule [SP∩ ] follows the idea already developed in [25,4] to give
a complete axiomatization for the intersection of some semantic relations. Although
intersection is not modally deﬁnable in ordinary quantiﬁer-free modal languages, it
becomes deﬁnable in languages with propositional quantiﬁers. Indeed, the following
quantiﬁed axiom modally deﬁnes semantic intersection.
< R1 ∩R2 > ϕ ⇔ ∀p (< R1 > (ϕ ∧ p)∨ < R2 > (ϕ ∧ ¬p)))
Rule [SP∩ ] ’simulates’ right to left direction while axiom (A9) corresponds to
the left to right direction.
A formula ϕ is a theorem of Lmin if it belongs to the least set of formulas
containing all axioms and closed under the rules of inference.
5.3 Soundness and completeness
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness of Lmin) Let ϕ be a formula. If ϕ is a theorem of
Lmin then ϕ is valid in every model.
Proof.
By induction on the length of a deduction of ϕ in Lmin, we that ϕ is valid in
every model. We only develop the special rule cases .
We treat the case where admissible form is .
[SP ] special rule: Let  ∈ {[], []}∗ and i¡0. Let ϕ be a formula such that
∀p ∈ P (ϕ ∨X ip) ⇒ Xip is a valid. We show that ¬[SP ]ϕ is valid. Suppose that
it is not the case: there is a model (W,, V ), and a state j, w ∈ Z ×W such that
j, w |= [SP ]ϕ. Let p be an atomic proposition which does not appear in ϕ. Let V ′ a
valuation such that V −1(p) = {(j+i, w′) / ¬SamePast((j, w), (j, w′))}. Considering
the model (W,, V ′), we have j, w |= (ϕ∨X ip). Indeed, let w′ a history accessible
from w by the composition of relations corresponding to . Either (j, w′) has the
same past as (j, w) and j, w |= ϕ, or (j, w′) has not the same past as (j, w), and
j, w |= Xip. Thus, we deduce that j, w |= Xip. This is in contradiction with the
deﬁnition of V ′ since (j, w) has the same past has itself.
[SP∩ ] special rule: Suppose that there is a model M = (W,, V ), and a
state (i, w) in M such that i, w |= [SP∩ ]ϕ. We have to show that ∃p ∈ P and
∃M ′, (i′, w′) such that i′, w′ |= [SP ](ϕ ∨ p) ∧ [](ϕ ∨ ¬p).
Consider an atom p which does not appear in ϕ. Let us deﬁne a valuation
V ′ such that V ′−1(p) = {(i, w′) / SamePast((i, w), (i, w′)) and ¬(w  w′)}, and
V ′−1(q) = V −1(q)∀q = p. Then, in the model (W,, V ′), i, w |= [SP ](ϕ ∨ p) ∧ [
](ϕ ∨ ¬p). 
Theorem 5.2 (Completeness of Lmin) Let ϕ be a formula. If ϕ is valid in every
model then ϕ is a theorem of Lmin.
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The completeness of Lmin is more diﬃcult to establish than its soundness and
we defer proving that Lmin is complete with respect to the class of all models till
section 5.5.
5.4 Theories
In this section we introduce the notions of theories and maximal theories, the latter
having a key role in the proof of the completeness theorem. A set x of formulas is
called a theory if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
(th 1) x contains the set of all theorems of Lmin.
(th 2) x is closed under modus ponens.
(th 3) x is closed under the [SP ] special rule.
(th 4) x is closed under the [SP∩ ] special rule.
Obviously the smallest theory is the set THmin of all theorems and the greatest
theory is the set of all formulas. The later theory is called trivial theory. A theory
x is called consistent if ⊥ /∈ x, otherwise it is called inconsistent. It is a well-known
fact that a theory x is consistent iﬀ it is not trivial and that x is inconsistent if it
contains a formula ϕ together with its negation ¬ϕ. A theory x is called a maximal
theory if it is consistent and for any formula ϕ: ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x. A set Σ of
formulas is called consistent if it is contained in a consistent theory. It can be
shown that a single formula ϕ is consistent (considered as a singleton {ϕ}), iﬀ it
is not equivalent to ⊥. In the literature, instead of maximal theory, the notion
of a maximal consistent set is used, where consistency is deﬁned without using the
notion of theory. It can be proved that each maximal theory is a maximal consistent
set in the classical sense, and each maximal consistent set which is closed under the
special rules for [SP ] and [SP∩ ] is a maximal theory. We will use the following
properties of maximal theories without explicit reference (x is a maximal theory):
•  ∈ x
• ¬ϕ ∈ x iﬀ ϕ /∈ x,
• ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ x iﬀ ϕ1 ∈ x or ϕ2 ∈ x,
• ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ x iﬀ ϕ1 ∈ x and ϕ2 ∈ x.
Let x be a set of formulas. If L ∈ {X,X−1, [SP ], [], [], [SP∩ ]} then deﬁne
Lx = {ϕ : Lϕ ∈ x}. If ϕ is a formula then deﬁne x + ϕ = {ϕ′ : ϕ ⇒ ϕ′ ∈ x}.
For all sets x of formulas, we deﬁne X0x = x,for each positive integer i, X iϕ
def
=
Xi−1Xϕ, and for each negative integer i, X iϕ def= X i+1X−1ϕ. In the next lemma
we summarize some properties of theories.
Lemma 5.3 Let x be a theory. The following statements hold.
(i) Lx is a theory too.
(ii) x + ϕ is the smallest theory containing x and ϕ.
(iii) x + ϕ is inconsistent iﬀ ¬ϕ ∈ x.
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(iv) If x is consistent and ¬A(¬[SP ]ϕ) ∈ x then for all  ∈ {[], []}, and for all
i < 0, there exists p ∈ P such that x + ¬A(¬(ϕ ∨Xip) ∨Xip) is consistent.
(v) If x is consistent and ¬A(〈SP∩ 〉ϕ) ∈ x then there exists p ∈ P such that
x + ¬A(〈SP 〉(ϕ ∧ p) ∨ 〈〉(ϕ ∧ ¬p)) is consistent.
Proof. We show statements (i) and (iv).
Statement 1. Let ϕ be a theorem. Then by the necessitation rules, Lϕ is a
theorem too. Hence, Lϕ ∈ x, so ϕ ∈ Lx. Thus, Lx contains the set of all theorems.
Let ϕ1 ∈ Lx and ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 ∈ Lx. Then Lϕ1 ∈ x and L(ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2) ∈ x. By the
axiom (K), L(ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2) ⇒ (Lϕ1 ⇒ Lϕ2) ∈ x. Applying modus ponens twice, we
obtain that Lϕ2 ∈ x, so ϕ2 ∈ Lx. Thus Lx is closed under modus ponens.
To show that Lx is closed under the [SP ] special rule, let  ∈ {[], []} and i < 0.
Suppose that we have A(¬(ϕ ∨Xip) ∨Xip) ∈ Lx. Then, for all p ∈ P , we obtain
LA(¬(ϕ∨X ip)∨X ip) ∈ x. Notice that LA(¬(ϕ∨Xip)∨X ip) is an admissible
form. Since x is closed under the [SP ] special rule, we obtain LA(¬[SP ]ϕ) ∈ x.
Hence, A(¬[SP ]ϕ) ∈ Lx. Thus, Lx is closed under the [SP ] special rule.
Similarly, one can prove that Lx is closed under the [SP∩ ] special rule.
Statement 4. Suppose that ¬A(¬[SP ]ϕ) ∈ x. Since x is consistent, then
A(¬[SP ]ϕ) /∈ x. Thus, since x is closed under the [SP ] special rule, then for
all  ∈ {[], []}∗ and for all i < 0, there exists p ∈ P such that A(¬(ϕ ∨
X ip) ∨ X ip) /∈ x. (Otherwise, A(¬[SP ]ϕ) would necessarily be in x.) Since x
is a theory, ¬A(¬(ϕ ∨ X ip) ∧ ¬Xip) ∈ x. From statement 3, we deduce that
x + ¬A(¬(ϕ ∨Xip) ∨Xip) is consistent.
The proof of statement (v) is similar.

Now we are ready for the main lemma in this section:
Lemma 5.4 Each consistent theory can be extended to a maximal theory.
Proof. Suppose x is a consistent theory and let ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . be an enumeration of
all formulas. We deﬁne an increasing sequence of consistent theories x0, x1, . . . by
induction as follows. Let x0 = x and suppose that for some integer n, the consistent
theory xn has already been deﬁned. For the deﬁnition of xn+1 we consider two cases.
Case 1: xn + ϕn is consistent. Then deﬁne xn+1 = xn + ϕn.
Case 2: xn + ϕn is not consistent. Then ¬ϕn ∈ x. In this case we consider two
sub-cases:
Sub-case 2.1: ϕn is neither in the form of a conclusion of the [SP ] special rule nor
in the form of a conclusion of the [SP∩ ] special rule. Then let xn+1 = xn.
Sub-case 2.2: ϕn is in the form of a conclusion of the [SP ] special rule or in the
form of a conclusion of the [SP∩ ] special rule. We only consider the case where
ϕn is in the form of a conclusion of the [SP∩ ] special rule, i.e. ϕn is in the
following form A(〈SP∩ 〉ϕ) where A is an admissible form. Therefore, there are
ﬁnitely many such representations for ϕn: Ai(〈SP∩ 〉ϕi) for i = 1, . . . , k. We
deﬁne inductively an increasing sequence of consistent theories xin for i = 0, . . . , k,
as follows. Let x0n = xn. Suppose x
i
n is deﬁned and consistent. Then it contains
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¬ϕn = ¬Ai(〈SP∩ 〉ϕi) and, by the properties of theories mentioned above, there
exists a propositional variable pi ∈ P such that xin+¬Ai(〈SP 〉(ϕi∧p)∨〈〉(ϕi∧¬p))





Now, we put xn+1 = xkn.
Finally, we deﬁne y =
⋃∞
i=0 xi. It is straightforward to demonstrate that y is a
maximal theory which extends x. 
5.5 Canonical model construction
The canonical model of Lmin is the structure Mc = (Wc,c, Vc) deﬁned as follows:
• Wc is the set of all maximal theories,
• c is the binary relation on Wc deﬁned by x c y iﬀ []x ⊆ y,
• Vc is the function which associates each pair (i, x) ∈ Z×Wc with the set Vc(i, x) =
{p : Xip ∈ x} of atomic propositions.
To prove the completeness of our axiomatic system, it suﬃces to demonstrate the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.5 Let ϕ be a formula. For all integers i ∈ Z and for all maximal theories
x ∈Wc, Mc, (i, x) |= ϕ iﬀ Xiϕ ∈ x.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the complexity of ϕ. We only consider
the cases ϕ = Lφ for L ∈ {X,X−1, [SP ], [], [], [SP∩ ]}.
Case ϕ = Xφ. Assume Mc, (i, x) |= Xϕ. Consequently, Mc, (i + 1, x) |= ϕ.
By induction hypothesis, Xi+1ϕ ∈ x. Hence, X iXϕ ∈ x. Reciprocally, assume
X iXϕ ∈ x. Therefore, X i+1ϕ ∈ x and, by induction hypothesis, Mc, (i+1, x) |= ϕ.
Thus, Mc, (i, x) |= Xϕ.
Case ϕ = X−1φ. Similar to the previous case.
Case ϕ = [SP ]φ. Assume Mc, (i, x) |= [SP ]ϕ. For the sake of the contradiction,
assume X i[SP ]ϕ ∈ x. Consequently, [SP ]ϕ ∈ X ix and ϕ ∈ [SP ]Xix. Hence,
the theory [SP ]X ix + ¬ϕ is consistent. By Lindenbaum’s lemma, there exists a
maximal theory y such that [SP ]Xix + ¬ϕ ⊆ y. Remark that [SP ]X ix ⊆ y and
¬ϕ ∈ y. Let z = X−iy. Remark that Xiz = y. Since ¬ϕ ∈ y, then X−iXi¬ϕ ∈ y
and Xi¬ϕ ∈ z. Therefore, X iϕ ∈ z and, by induction hypothesis, Mc, (i, z) |= ϕ.
Since Mc, (i, x) |= [SP ]ϕ, then x and z do not have the same past with respect to i.
Thus, there exists an integer j ∈ Z such that i > j and for some atomic proposition
p, either Xjp ∈ x and Xjp ∈ z or Xjp ∈ x and Xjp ∈ z. Without loss of generality,
let us suppose that Xjp ∈ x and Xjp ∈ z. Remark that [SP ]Xix ⊆ Xiz. Since
Xjp ∈ z, then Xj−ip ∈ Xiz. Since [SP ]Xix ⊆ Xiz, then [SP ]Xj−ip ∈ Xix.
Consequently, we have Xjp ∈ x and Xi[SP ]Xj−ip ∈ x: a contradiction with i > j
and axiom (A6). Reciprocally, assume that X i[SP ]ϕ ∈ x and let us show that
Mc, (i, x) |= [SP ]ϕ. For the sake of the contradiction, assume that Mc, (i, x) |=
[SP ]ϕ. Consequently, there exists y ∈Wc such that x and y have the same past with
respect to i and Mc, (i, y) |= ϕ. By induction hypothesis, Xiϕ ∈ y and ϕ ∈ Xiy.
Since Xi[SP ]ϕ ∈ x, then ¬[SP ]ϕ ∈ X ix. Let  ∈ {[], []} be such that x ⊆ y
and j ∈ Z be such that i > j. Remark that j − i < 0. Since Xix is a theory,
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then Xix is closed under the [SP ] special rule. Since ¬[SP ]ϕ ∈ Xix, then there
exists an atomic proposition p such that ¬(ϕ∨Xj−ip)∨Xj−ip ∈ Xix. Therefore,
Xi(ϕ ∨Xj−ip) ∈ x and Xj¬p ∈ x. Thus, (Xiϕ ∨Xjp) ∈ x. Since x ⊆ y, then
X iϕ ∈ y or Xjp ∈ y. If Xiϕ ∈ y then ϕ ∈ Xiy: a contradiction. If Xjp ∈ y then
Xjp ∈ x, seeing that x and y have the same past with respect to i and i > j. This
contradicts the fact that Xj¬p ∈ x.
Case ϕ = [SP∩ ]φ. Similar to the previous case (use the special rule for [SP∩ ]
and the axiom (A9) instead of the special rule for [SP ] and the axiom (A6).
Case ϕ = []φ. Assume Mc, (i, x) |= []ϕ. For the sake of the contradiction,
assume X i[]ϕ ∈ x. Consequently, []ϕ ∈ Xix and ϕ ∈ []Xix. Hence, the
theory []Xix+¬ϕ is consistent. By Lindenbaum’s lemma, there exists a maximal
theory y such that []Xix + ¬ϕ ⊆ y. Remark that []Xix ⊆ y and ¬ϕ ∈ y.
Let z = X−iy. Remark that Xiz = y. Since ¬ϕ ∈ y, then X−iXi¬ϕ ∈ y and
Xi¬ϕ ∈ z. Therefore, X iϕ ∈ z and, by induction hypothesis, Mc, (i, z) |= ϕ.
Since Mc, (i, x) |= []ϕ, then x c z. Thus, there exists a formula ψ such that
[]ψ ∈ x and ψ ∈ z. Hence, X−iψ ∈ y, X−iψ ∈ []Xix + ¬ϕ, X−iψ ∈ []Xix
and Xi[]X−iψ ∈ x. Thus, []XiX−iψ ∈ x and []ψ ∈ x: a contradiction.
Reciprocally, assume that X i[]ϕ ∈ x and let us show that Mc, (i, x) |= []ϕ. For
the sake of the contradiction, assume that Mc, (i, x) |= []ϕ. Consequently, there
exists y ∈ Wc such that x c y and Mc, (i, y) |= ϕ. By induction hypothesis,
X iϕ ∈ y. Since x c y, then []x ⊆ y. Consequently, Xiϕ ∈ []x and []Xiϕ ∈ x.
Hence, X i[]ϕ ∈ x: a contradiction.
Case ϕ = []φ. Similar to the previous case. 
Now, we are ready for proving the main theorem of this section.
Proof of theorem 5.2. Let ϕ be a formula. Assume ϕ is not a theorem of Lmin.
Consequently, THmin + ¬ϕ is a consistent theory. By Lindenbaum’s lemma, there
exists a maximal theory x such that THmin + ¬ϕ ⊆ x. Hence, ¬ϕ ∈ x, ϕ ∈ x and
X0ϕ ∈ x. By the lemma 5.5, Mc, (0, x) |= ϕ. Thus, ϕ is not valid.
6 Conclusion
We have designed a tableaux method which can handle the fragment of our lan-
guage restricted to until-free formulas. Our method is sound and complete. A
termination strategy based on loop detection shows that our tableaux method can
be implemented as a decision procedure. We have also given a sound and com-
plete axiomatization of the set of formulas valid in the class of all models, without
considering the -totality constraint. Remark that this set of valid formulas is
not closed with respect to the rule of uniform substitution, seeing that the for-
mula X−1p→ [SP ]X−1p is valid for any atomic proposition p whereas the formula
X−1Xp → [SP ]X−1Xp (or, equivalently, the formula p → [SP ]p) is not valid.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt at developing a decision
procedure and an axiom system for a modal logic with such an operator as [SP ].
Plans for future work include: developing a decision procedure for the language
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that includes the until operator ; designing an axiom system that is sound and
complete with respect to validity in the class of all models (W,, V ) where  is
total ; adapting our tableaux method and our axiom system to the case where
the set P of all atomic propositions is inﬁnite. Note that if P is inﬁnite then the
inference rules for the modalities [SP ] and [SP∩ ] become inﬁnitary, i.e. they
both need inﬁnitely many preconditions before one can apply them. In this case, an
open question is whether one can replace these inﬁnitary inference rules by ﬁnitary
ones.
References
[1] L. A˚qvist. Combinations of tense and deontic logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 3:421–460, 2005.
[2] L. A˚qvist and J. Hoepelman. Some theorems about a tree system of deontic tense logic. In R. Hilpinen,
editor, New Studies in Deontic Logic, pages 187–221. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981.
[3] P. Bailhache. Canonical models for temporal deontic logic. Logique et Analyse, pages 3–21, 1995.
[4] P. Balbiani and D. Vakarelov. Iteration-free pdl with intersection: a complete axiomatization.
Fundamenta Informaticae, 45(3):173–194, 2001.
[5] J. Broersen. Strategic deontic temporal logic as a reduction to ATL, with an application to Chisholm’s
scenario. In L. Goble and J.-J. C. Meyer, editors, Proc. of 8th International Workshop on Deontic
Logic in Computer Science (DEON’06), volume 4048 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
53–68. Springer, 2006.
[6] J. Broersen and J. Brunel. ‘What I fail to do today, I have to do tomorrow’: a logical study of the
propagation of obligations. In F. Sadri and K. Satoh, editors, Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on
Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA-VIII), Porto, Portugal, September 2007.
[7] J. Brunel, J.-P. Bodeveix, and M. Filali. A state/event temporal deontic logic. In L. Goble and
J.-J. C. Meyer, editors, Proc. of 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science
(DEON’06), volume 4048 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 85–100. Springer, 2006.
[8] R. Chisholm. Contrary-to-duty imperatives and deontic logic. Analysis, 24:33–36, 1963.
[9] F. Cuppens, N. Cuppens-Boulahia, and T. Sans. Nomad: a security model with non atomic actions and
deadlines. In Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, June 2005.
[10] F. Dignum and R. Kuiper. Obligations and dense time for specifying deadlines. In Thirty-First Annual
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS)-Volume 5, 1998.
[11] J. A. V. Eck. A system of temporally relative modal and deontic predicate logic and its philosophical
applications. Logique et Analyse, 99 and 100:249–290 and 339–381, 1982.
[12] L. Farin˜as del Cerro and O. Gasquet. Tableaux based decision procedures for modal logics of conﬂuence
and density. Fundamenta Informaticae, 4:317–333, 1999.
[13] M. Fitting. Proof Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Logics, volume 169 of Synthese library. D.
Reidel Publishing Company, 1983.
[14] J. Forrester. Gentle murder, or the adverbial Samaritan. The Journal of Philosophy, 81(4):193–197,
1984.
[15] D. Gabbay, A. Kurucz, F. Wolter, and M. Zakharyachev. Many-Dimensional Modal Logics: Theory
and Applications. Elsevier, 2003.
[16] D. Gabbay and V. B. Shehtman. Products of modal logics, part 1. Logic journal of IGPL, 6(1):73–146,
1998.
[17] J. Horty. Agency and Deontic Logic. Oxford University Press, 2001.
[18] T. Maibaum. Temporal reasoning over deontic speciﬁcations. In J.-J. C. Meyer and R. Wieringa,
editors, Deontic Logic in Computer Science: Normative System Speciﬁcation, pages 141–202. John
Wiley & Sons, 1994.
P. Balbiani et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 231 (2009) 69–8988
[19] Z. Manna and A. Pnueli. The anchored version of the temporal framework. In J. de Bakker,
W. de Roever, and G. Rosenberg, editors, Logics and Models for Concurrency, volume 354 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 201–284. Springer-Verlag, 1989.
[20] F. Massacci. Single step tableaux for modal logics. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 24:319–364, 2000.
[21] A. Pnueli. The temporal semantics of concurrent programs. Theoretical Computer Science, 13:45–60,
1981.
[22] H. Prakken and M. Sergot. Contrary-to-duty obligations and defeasible reasoning. Studia Logica,
57:91–115, 1996.
[23] R. Thomason. Deontic logic as founded on tense logic. In R. Hilpinen, editor, New Studies in Deontic
Logic, pages 165–176. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981.
[24] R. H. Thomason. Combinations of tense and modality. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors,
Handbook of Philosophical Logic: Extensions of Classical Logic, pages 135–165. Reidel, 1984.
[25] D. Vakarelov. Modal rules for intersection. In Abstract of the 10th international congress of Logic,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Florence, Italy, 1995.
[26] J. van Benthem and F. Liu. Dynamic logic of preference upgrade. Journal of Applied Non-Classical
Logic, 14, 2004.
[27] G. H. Von Wright. Deontic logic. Mind, 1951.
[28] F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev. Satisiﬁability problem in description logics with modal operators.
In A. Cohn, L. Schubert, and S. Shapiro, editors, 6th Conference on Principles of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning (KR’98), pages 512–523, 1998.
P. Balbiani et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 231 (2009) 69–89 89
